Excerpt:  Strategy & Politics, part two

For as long as the world has seen political rulers, there have been political go-betweens, trusted messengers who travel back and forth tirelessly to communicate with the utmost discretion, for purposes benign and malign.  Diplomacy is one of the world’s oldest professions.  And for good reason.  As political scientist and University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer* has bleakly observed: 

“Power is wielded by states.  States fear each other, and the more powerful they are - in population, wealth and military clout - the more the others fear them.  Each state has to look after itself;  there is no higher authority it can call upon for help…”**

* https://www.mearsheimer.com/

** Anonymous, “No, realists can be optimists too,” The Economist (October 6 2001): 77

Such is the perspective of the realists’ school of political thought and, if you as a ruler adhere to this perspective, then the critical role of your diplomatic corps is easily understood.

Naturally, given the ubiquity of diplomacy across time and geography, it is not the only school of thought in international relations.

“In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasise cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their scepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterised by active or potential conflict among states, where ethical standards do not apply.”*

* Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/realism-intl-relations/>

Fortunately, given its importance, there’s an enormous body of research and numerous institutes of learning dedicated to the field of diplomacy.  For strategists, studying this field is a priority.  Some would even argue that the very concept of strategy is tied inherently to the history of geopolitics and international relations.  For the purposes of this chapter on strategy & politics, we will touch on a few insights and highlights, providing sufficient touchpoints and references to allow you, the reader, to dive deeper as interested.

One approach is to read about outstanding examples of practitioners, such as George Kennan, the American diplomat and political thinker who influenced greatly the Cold War policies of the United States, ideas such as containment of the Soviet Union, the post-war development aid program for Europe (the Marshall Plan), and the covert-operations wing of the CIA.

“The Long Telegram was Kennan unbound. Yes, he said, American capitalism and Soviet Communism were incompatible systems; Washington shouldn’t have been surprised to hear Stalin say so. But this had more to do with the nature of Russia than with the nature of Communism. Russian foreign policy had always been motivated by fear of the outside world, and Marxism gave the current regime, which Kennan considered simply the latest in a line of Oriental despotisms, an ideological fig leaf for its insecurity and paranoia. Whatever it might say, the Soviet Union would always seek to undermine the West. That was just the Kremlin’s nature.”*

* Menand, L., “Getting Real,” The New Yorker (November 14 2011): 80

Menand argues that Kennan’s view was shaped both by his upbringing and by his pre-war exposure to Russia, and that he was able to hold separate his appraisals of the Russian people and the Soviet Communist Party leadership, especially Josef Stalin.

“Kennan didn’t say that the Soviets were reasonable or democratic or decent in any way; he said that we did not need to drop the bomb on them.”*

* Ibid, p82

One would place Kennan in the realist camp, in other words...